




The Sources of Long-Run Growth in Spain, 
1850–2000 
 
LEANDRO PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA AND JOAN R. ROSÉS 
 
Between 1850 and 2000 Spain’s real output and labor productivity grew at 
average rates of 2.5 and 2.1 percent. The sources of this long-run growth are 
investigated here for the first time. Broad capital accumulation and efficiency 
gains appear as complementary in Spain’s long-term growth. Factor accumulation 
dominated long-run growth up to 1950, while total factor productivity (TFP) led 
thereafter and, especially, during periods of growth acceleration. The main spurts 
in TFP and capital coincide with the impact of the railroads (1850s–1880), the 
electrification (the 1920s and 1950s), and to the adoption of new vintage 
technology during the Golden Age.  
 
ver the last century and a half, aggregate economic activity in 
Spain experienced a 43-fold increase, growing at 2.5 percent per 
year, and per capita GDP was 16 times larger than in 1850, implying  
an annual rate of 1.9 percent.
1 GDP per hour worked expanded at a 
faster rate (2.1 percent) as hours of work per person declined. This 
economic growth, however, did not take place at a steady rate. During 
the Golden Age (1950–1974), per capita GDP rose seven times faster 
than in the previous hundred years, and twice as fast as during the   
last quarter of the twentieth century. Does factor accumulation or 
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productivity improvement—“abstention” or “ingenuity” to use D. N. 
McCloskey’s words—account for it?
2 In fact, no consensus has 
emerged about the relative importance of the contributions of factor 
accumulation and TFP to GDP growth, nor do we know whether a 
temporal sequence can be established for their relative contributions to 
growth.
3 Susan Collins and Barry Bosworth have suggested that, in its 
early stages, growth is primarily associated with capital accumulation, 
while TFP only emerges later.
4 Studying the sources of Spain’s growth 
over 150 years provides an unusual opportunity to explore these issues.
5 
  We use a growth accounting approach which allows us to decompose 
Spain’s long-run growth into the contribution of production factors in 
terms of quantity and efficiency.
6 The sources of Spain’s growth have 
changed dramatically since 1850. Broad capital accumulation and   
TFP growth appear complementary in Spain’s long-term growth, and   
our results for Spain confirm Collins and Bosworth’s finding of low   
TFP growth for countries in their early stages of development.
7 Factor 
accumulation dominated long-run growth up to 1950, while efficiency 
gains led thereafter and, especially, during periods of growth acceleration. 
The main spurts in TFP and capital correspond to the impact of the 
railroad (1850s–1880s), the electrification (the 1920s and 1950s), and the 
adoption of new vintage technology during the Golden Age (1950–1974).  
  The rest of the article is divided into three parts. We begin by 
describing the growth accounting adopted in this article and also present 
our new database, which comprises new estimates of GDP and of capital 
and labor inputs, over one-and-a-half centuries. We next discuss the role 
 
2 McCloskey, “Industrial Revolution.”  
3 Cf. Crafts, British Economic Growth; and Mokyr, “New Economic History,” on the case of 
Britain and Denison and Poullier, Why Growth Rates Differ, pioneering study on Western 
Europe (but not including Spain) and the United States in the post-World War II era. On 
developing countries, including and some comparisons with post-World War II Europe, see 
Krugman, “Myth”; Young, “Tyranny of Numbers”; Collins and Bosworth, “Economic Growth”; 
Crafts, “East Asian Trend Growth”; and Bosworth and Collins, “Empirics of Growth.”  
4 Collins and Bosworth, “Economic Growth,” p. 186. 
5 Unfortunately, detailed growth-accounting exercises with long-run evidence are rare. See, 
for example,  Maddison, “Growth and Slowdown”; Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee, 
British Economic Growth; and Carré, Dubois, and Malinvaud, French Economic Growth,  
for Europe and Kendrick, Productivity; and Abramovitz and David, “Two Centuries,” for the 
United States.  
6  This framework does not include a particular growth theory since it only provides a 
descriptive procedure and it is, therefore, compatible with the alternative specifications of 
different growth models (Barro, “Growth Accounting”; and Collins and Bosworth, “Economic 
Growth,” p. 139). In this article, we make a historical adaptation of Domar’s, “Measurement of 
Technological Change,” and Griliches and Jorgenson’s, “Explanation of Productivity Change,” 
approach to measure factor inputs in terms of quality.  
7 As Collins and Bosworth, “Economic Growth,” p. 164, point out, technical advances might 
be embodied in new capital, while increasing TFP might induce greater capital accumulation by 
raising the returns to capital.  
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of TFP and factor accumulation in GDP and labor productivity growth. 
We conclude with some remarks on the significance of the Spanish 
experience and some questions for future research.  
 
THE “PROXIMATE” SOURCES OF GROWTH: METHODS AND 
SOURCES 
 
  Growth accounting is “a means of allocating observed output growth 
between the contributions of changes in factor inputs and a residual,   
total factor productivity, which measures a combination of changes in 
efficiency in the use of those inputs and changes in technology.”
8 In   
the growth accounting approach favored by Dale J. Jorgenson, superlative 
indices are used, as well as heterogeneous measures of factor inputs that 




The Translog Index of Total Factor Productivity  
 
  The point of departure for our estimate of the sources of long-run 
growth in Spain is the production function given by 
 
   ) , , ( L K X   F   =   Q  (1) 
 





22 11 Q =   +  lnX + lnK +  lnL + (lnX  +  (lnK   )) aa a a b b xkl x x k k 22
2 1 +  (lnL   lnX lnK+  lnX lnL +  lnK lnL ) bb b b ll xk xl kl 2
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If we consider two discrete periods of time, we have, after differentiating 
and taking logarithms, 
 
  
ln ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln
QQ  =   [ X X ]  + [ KK ]   tt 1 tt 1 tt 1 XK
+ [ L L ]  +  TFP tt 1 t1 , t , L
  TT  




8 Bosworth and Collins, “Empirics of Growth,” p. 114.  
9 The result should be a reduction in the “unexplained residual” (total factor productivity) 
since the “residual” no longer includes composition (“quality”) changes in inputs. See 
Jorgenson, “Productivity.” A major difference between Jorgenson’s approach and the 
conventional approach (as presented, for example, in Denison, Sources) is that in the former 
capital is cross-classified by type of asset and weighted it by its rental rates.  
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Here și denotes the elasticity of output with respect to each input.
10 Under 
the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale these 
elasticities are equivalent to the share of inputs in total factor payments. 
Under constant returns to scale, the values of factor shares sum to unity. 
Weights are then given by the average share of each factor input in total 
output for the two periods. The translog index of TFP (TFPt–1,t) is the 
difference between the growth rate of output and a weighted average of 
the growth rates of factor inputs.  
  The rate of growth of output and of each input i between two periods is 
a weighted average of the growth rates of its n quality classes.
11 The 
respective equations for output, land, capital, and labor are 
 
   =[( ) ] lnQ lnQ lnQi lnQi Q i t t-1 t t-1 T  ¦  (4) 
 
   ln ln ln ln =[ ( X ) ] Xi i XX X tt 1 tt 1 i T  ¦    (5) 
 
   =[ ( ) ] lnK lnK lnCi lnCi K tt 1 t t 1 i T  ¦   (6) 
 
   =[( ) ] lnL lnL lnLi lnLi L tt 1 t t 1 i T  ¦   (7) 
 
where share values are computed as 
 





We develop our measure of capital input (which is an index   
number of the flow of services provided by the stock of capital) in three 
successive phases.
12 First, we construct the stock of capital.
13 Second, we 
 
10 See Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau, “Transcendental Logarithmic.” 
11 By quality classes we mean the different types of assets and workers, in the cases of capital 
and labor, or the main sectors of economic activity (agriculture, industry, construction, and 
services), in the case of output. For example, L can be viewed as a vector that denotes the 
quantities of labor of various types, categorized by age, sex, education, and so on. See Barro, 
“Growth Accounting,” p. 121. The share of each quality class in total payments for each input 
or output provides its weight. 
12 As is usually assumed, capital input (K) in year t is proportional to the stock of capital C at 
the beginning of the period t. Thus, Kt = O · Ct-1, where the constant (O) transforms the capital 
stock into its services, and where the capital stock Ct moves according to the new investments, at 
constant prices, during the year, and to the depreciation and replacement rates. Cf. Jorgenson, 
“Productivity.” 
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estimate the rental price of capital (or price of capital services) and the 
total returns to capital (the value of capital services). Finally, we weight 
the quantity of each asset by its share in the total returns to capital in order 
to derive a single capital input index.  
Since new additions to the stock of capital (investment, It) are 
directly observable while the stock, Ct, is not, we need to infer the stock 
of capital (C) for the year t from the accumulation of investment (I)  
in past years, taking into account that a part of the stock is retired when 
obsolete.
14  With the perpetual inventory method (PIM), the stock  of 
capital in the year t (Ct) is equal to the weighted sum of the investment 
realized during this same year and the previous ones, where each 
generation of capital is weighted by its depreciation rate in period t.
15  
 
   C t = (1 – G t) Ct–1 + It (9) 
 
Thus the capital stock C in year t is equal to the amount of capital in 
year t–1 multiplied by 1 minus the depreciation rate (G) of the year   
t, plus the gross fixed capital formation, I, during the year t.
16 The 
depreciation rate is inversely related to the asset life, so G = X/T, where 
X is a parameter (declining balance) and T is the life of each type of 
asset.
17 This method generates a measure of capital that takes into 
 
 
13 We define the stock of capital as all tangible goods that can be used during more than one 
period to produce other goods and services. More specifically, the capital stock comprises residential 
and nonresidential structures, transport equipment, and producer durable equipment (machinery and 
equipment). 
14 Data on yearly investment (quantities and prices) by type of asset are taken from Prados de la 
Escosura, Progreso. 
15 This is the case under the following assumptions: (1) all durable goods bought in a certain 
period t form a vintage of capital; (2) the services produced for different vintages of capital in 
period t are perfect substitutes; and (3) their services are proportional to the initial investment. 
See Hulten, “Measurement of Capital.” 
16 The use of the PIM method requires, thus, (1) an initial benchmark for the stock of capital; 
(2) historical series of Gross Fixed Capital Formation by types of assets, at constant prices; and 
(3) the efficiency of each vintage of capital. 
17  If depreciation is assumed to be arithmetic, X takes the value of 1; if, alternatively, 
depreciation is assumed to be geometric, X equals 2. In our case, following Jorgenson, 
“Productivity,” we adopted the “modified” geometric depreciation pattern, in between the 
arithmetic and geometric patterns. According to Hulten and Wykoff, “Economic Depreciation,” 
the parameter X is 1.65 for machinery and equipment and 0.91 for buildings and structures. 
These values were derived from a careful econometric exercise in which a large data base was 
used. Accepting the X parameter’s values from Hulten and Wykoff, ibid., for historical purposes 
is arbitrary. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that these parameters have been widely employed in 
empirical studies as they correspond to the technological frontier to which countries tend to 
converge. For Spain, the alternative assumptions of X = 1 (arithmetic depreciation) and X = 2 
(geometric depreciation) do not lead to significantly different results for the stock of capital. See 
Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Capital Accumulation.” 
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account the productive capacity of each component and, hence, 
measures capital stock in efficiency units.
18 Since assets lives tend to 
shorten as one gets closer to the present, three different epochs (1850–
1919, 1920–1959, and 1960–2000), with their particular asset lives, are 
considered for “productive” capital (that is, for all capital assets except 
residential dwellings).
19 
The second step in developing measures of capital input is to 
construct rental prices for each type of capital asset. In competitive 
equilibrium, the cost of producing a unit of capital is equal to its price 
and the expected rent during its life. If we assume that old and new 
vintages of capital are perfect substitutes, the rental price of capital, pk, 
in year t, can be estimated as 
 
   11 (t) = Pi r  +  pi    [Pi Pi ] p tt t t t k G    (10) 
 
where pi is the investment price of the capital good i, r is the nominal 
rate of return, and į is the depreciation rate for the capital good i.
20 The 
rental price of capital asset i is thus the sum of return per unit of capital, 
Pit–1 rt, depreciation, į pit, and the negative of revaluation, [pit – pit–1].
21  
  Multiplying the rental price of capital asset i by the quantity of capital 
stock i, we obtain the returns to capital asset i. Adding up the returns to 
each type of asset we derive the total returns to capital, which equals 
capital property compensation. The shares of each type of asset in total   
 
 
18 Hulten, “Measurement of Capital.” Unfortunately, we cannot explore all the changes in the 
composition (quality) of capital since our deaggregation by type of asset in not deep enough.  
19 For each type of capital assets, its life was established from available information. Thus, 
dwellings are assigned an average service life of 70 years, while for the rest of assets we 
assumed that service lives decline over time. Thus, for each of the three periods (1850–1919, 
1920–1959, and 1960–2000) nonresidential structures were respectively assigned lives of 56, 
55, and 40 years; transport equipment, 37, 28, and 15 years; and machinery and equipment, 30, 
20, and 15 years. These assumed lives are in line with those used in major historical works 
(Feinstein, “Sources and Methods,” for the United Kingdom; and Jorgenson, “Capital,” for the 
United States) and tend to be on the conservative (high) side when compared with available 
studies for late-twentieth-century Spain. Further details on the construction of capital measures, 
including alternative estimates of (gross and net) capital stock constructed using arithmetic 
depreciation rates, are provided in Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Capital Accumulation.” 
The main trends in capital stock and input offered here are robust to these alternative estimates. 
20 Jorgenson, “Productivity”; and Hall and Jorgenson, “Tax Policy.” 
21  Jorgenson, “Capital,” p. 10. It should be noted that we have already established the 
depreciation rates and the prices of acquisition of capital for Spain, but we do not know the rates 
of return. There are two methods for estimating rates of return (r). The first uses the long-run 
interest rate as equivalent to the rate of return to capital under perfect competition. The second 
derives the rate of return from the share of national income received by the owners of capital 
assets as a compensation for their property, which can be derived by solving equation 9. The 
difference between the two estimations represents monopolistic competition rents. 
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returns to capital will be used as weights in the computation of the capital 
input index. A capital good with a higher amortization rate receives   
a larger weight in the index of capital input; a million dollars worth   
of machinery, for example, is allocated a higher weight than a million 
dollars worth of dwellings. The implication is that changes in the stock 
composition from long duration (and low rate of return) to short 
duration (and high rate of return) capital goods represent an increase in 
the quality of capital. The final step is to construct a capital input index 
by combining the quantity of each asset with its share in the total 
returns to capital as in expression 6.  
  The ratio between the capital input and the capital stock provides   
a measure of the capital’s composition changes or “quality” of capital. 
However, the idea that technological change embodied in capital is 
captured by increases in the “quality” of capital lacks consensus and has 
been rejected by Alwyn Young and Moses Abramovitz and Paul David, 
who consider that technological progress embodied in capital will 
appear in the “residual.”
22 
  An additional difficulty involved establishing the initial level of 
capital stock (C0) for each type of asset j in our PIM estimate. We 
derived this initial stock by assuming that the growth rate of investment 




   C 0j = I0j / (G + g) (11) 
 
where C is the capital stock, I the investment rate, G the depreciation 
rate, and g the rate of growth between 1850–1854 and 1855–1859 for 
each type of asset j. However, it seems plausible that the growth of 
investment was significantly slower before the 1850s (the decade in 
which railroads were introduced in Spain) and we have consequently 
assumed that the initial capital stock would have been twice as high as 
the figure derived from this computation.
24  
 
22 Young, “Tyranny of Numbers,” p. 649, argues that if each input i is assumed to be identical 
over time, then increases in the efficiency of the input will appear in the “residual,” as happens 
in our case. Cf. Abramovitz and David, “Two Centuries,” p. 23; and Hulten, “Measurement of 
Capital,” p. 134 and “Growth Accounting.”  
23 Baigés, Molinas, and Sebastián, Economía española; and Young, “Tyranny of Numbers.”  
24 This correction in the initial assumption 11 reduces the contribution of capital to GDP 
growth and, hence, increases that of TFP. Nonetheless, the effect of the assumption about the 
initial capital stock fades away over time. Cf. Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Capital 
Accumulation.” 




CAPITAL STOCK AND INPUT GROWTH, 1850–2000  
(annual average logarithmic rates in percent) 








1850–2000   3.5  3.7  0.2 
Panel A        
1850–1950   2.7  2.8  0.2 
1951–1974   6.0  6.4  0.4 
1975–2000   4.5  4.7  0.1 
Panel B        
1850–1883   3.6  4.0  0.3 
1884–1920   2.3  2.4  0.1 
1921–1929   3.5  3.9  0.4 
1930–1952   1.6  1.5  –0.1 
1953–1958   4.5  4.9  0.5 
1959–1974   7.0  7.4  0.4 
1975–1986   4.5  4.5  0.0 
1987–2000 4.6  4.8  0.2 
Note: The long periods in Panel A derive from structural breaks in a trend stationary GDP. 
Phases in Panel B are obtained as deviations from the trend in GDP (Prados de la Escosura, 
“Growth”).  Growth rates are average annual logarithmic rates of change over periods delimited 
by peak years. 
Sources: See the text and Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Capital Accumulation.” 
 
  Finally, the long-run interest rate was used to approximate the rate   
of return on capital under perfect competition.
25 Table 1 presents the 
evolution of capital stock and input from 1850 to 2000.
26  
  As Table 1, Panel A, shows, the capital input and stock do not follow a 
steady path. Expansion was more intense during the Golden Age, but   
did not return to the pre-1950 path of growth thereafter. Different phases 
of growth can be distinguished that, with the exception of the decade of 
transition to democracy (1975–1985), match GDP performance (Table 1, 
Panel B). After an initial period of intense progress up to the early 1880s, 
capital growth slowed down until World War I, resumed in the 1920s, and 
 
25 As a proxy for the long-term interest rate, we used the internal rate of return for private 
assets for the period since 1954 that comes from the MOISSES and BDMORES databases 
(Dabán et al., “Base de datos”), while the corporate rates of return were employed for 1880–
1954 (Tafunell, “Rentabilidad financiera”), and the net rate of return on public debt for 1850–
1880 (Tafunell, “Empresa y bolsa”). 
26 Three long periods: 1850–1950, 1951–1974, and 1975–2000, can be established in Panel A 
using the structural breaks in Spanish trend stationary GDP growth (Prados de la Escosura, 
“Growth”). In Panel B, long swings are estimated as deviations from the established trend in 
GDP. Growth rates are measured as average annual logarithmic rates of change over periods 
delimited by peak years.  





THE COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL STOCK, 1850–2000 (1995 pesetas) 
(percent) 
 
Source: Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Capital Accumulation.” 
 
was interrupted from the 1930s to the early 1950s. Since the early 1950s 
capital accumulation grew at a faster and steadier pace, with a big spurt in 
the years 1959–1974.  
  Changes in the composition of capital from residential   
construction toward nonresidential structures and, especially, machinery 
and equipment (Figure 1) increased the services provided by the capital 
stock and reflected a growing gap between the growth rates of capital 
input and stock (the so-called quality of capital) that rose in phases of fast 
capital growth (Table 1, column 3 and Figure 2). Three periods stand out 
in which capital quality grew more rapidly than the long-run trend: from 
the mid-1850s to the early 1880s, when foreign capital was invested in 
the railroads construction and in mining; the 1920s, when a new wave of 
foreign capital inflow and the electrification of Spanish economy took 
place; and  the Golden Age (1953–1974), in which Spain completed 
electrification and replaced the old vintage capital after two decades of 
international isolation during the Great Depression, the Civil War (1936–
1939), and the early Franco regime. It is worth noting that in spite of 
receiving a large influx of foreign capital since its accession to the 































































































QUALITY OF CAPITAL, 1850–2000 (1850 = 1) 
 
Note: By quality of capital is meant the ratio between the capital input and the capital stock. An 
increase in the quality of capital represents changes in the stock composition from long duration 
(and low rate of return) to short duration (and high rate of return) capital goods. 
Source: Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Capital Accumulation.” 
 
historical trend rate over 1986–2000, suggesting a weak and delayed 
impact of information technology.
27 
 
 Land Input 
 
  Often in growth accounting exercises land is considered together with 
the capital stock because it is hard to determine the actual amount of land 
in use.
28 Establishing the price of unimproved land, which is the relevant 
one, is also a major obstacle since the market price of land includes 
improvements, which are a capital input. Nonetheless, following the usual 
 
27  See Mas and Quesada, “ICT and Economic Growth”; and Timmer and van Ark, 
“Information and Communication Technology.” 
28  Cf. Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee, British Economic Growth, p. 205; and 
Maddison, “Growth and Slowdown,” p. 660. In Spain, San Juan, Eficacia y rentabilidad, does 
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practice in historical research, we consider land as an independent factor 
of production.
29  
  Since we found it impossible to distinguish the part that corresponded 
to capital incorporated into the improved land, we settled for a crude 
estimate of the land stock. The first step was to elaborate yearly figures 
for the stock of land. Unfortunately, estimates for total agricultural land 
only exist at some benchmarks before the late 1950s that we have 
interpolated to derive annual figures and, then, adjusted for the economic 
cycle with the deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott trend in agricultural 
output.
30 Next, we converted hectares of land into a stock by weighting 
each type of land by its price at two different benchmark years (1931 and 
1985) and splicing the resulting quantity indices into a single Laspeyres 
index for the entire period considered.
31 Since the land stock grew little 
over the long run (Table  2),  and certainly much less than capital and 






  The appropriate measure of labor input is the flow of services for 
production emanating from this factor.
33 Hence, our task is to estimate 
 
 
29 See, for example, Crafts, British Economic Growth; and Antrás and Voth, “Factor Prices.” 
Bosworth and Collins, “China and India,” also include land as an independent factor for present-
day developing countries. 
30 The benchmarks correspond to the following years, 1834, 1860, 1891–1895, 1897–1901, 
1909–1913, 1920–1922, 1929–1933, 1950, and 1958. The sources from which our estimates 
have been constructed are Garrabou and Sanz, Historia Agraria, for 1834 and 1860; Simpson, 
Spanish Agriculture, for 1891–1895 to 1929–1933; Banco Urquijo, Riqueza, for 1920; and 
O’Brien and Prados de la Escosura, “Agricultural Productivity,” background computations, for 
1891–1980; Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural Development, and Prasada Rao Intercountry 
Comparisons, provide international comparable aggregate land estimates for 1960 and at five 
year benchmarks for 1970–1990, respectively. Fortunately for main crops (major cereals, roots, 
fruit trees, vine and olive) annual figures are available (Barciela et al., “Sector agrario”). 
Agricultural output comes from Prados de la Escosura, Progreso. 
31 Indices with fixed weights (land prices) for 1931 and 1985 were respectively constructed 
for 1850–1958 and 1958–2000 and, then, spliced into a single quantity index of the stock of 
agricultural land. Land prices for 1931 and 1985 come from Bringas, Productividad de los 
Factores; and Ministerio de Agricultura, Estadística Agroalimentaria, respectively. There are 
minor differences between the stock estimates (Laspeyres index) and the number of hectares 
index at least until the 1960s, which suggests that only minor composition changes took place 
over the first hundred years considered. 
32 Contrary to Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee’s British Economic Growth, p. 206, 
suggestion, adding land reduces factor input growth and, hence, increases that of TFP. 
33 It is usually assumed that such a flow is proportional to the hours of work involved. That is, 
 
   Lt = Ȝ Ht ,  (12) 




CHANGE IN THE LAND STOCK, 1850–2000  
(annual average logarithmic rates in percent) 
1850–2000   0.2 
Panel A    
1850–1950   0.2 
1951–1974   1.0 
1975–2000   –0.4 
Panel B    
1850–1883   0.1 
1884–1920   0.8 
1921–1929   1.0 
1930–1952   0.2 
1953–1958   –2.2 
1959–1974   1.0 
1975–1986   –1.0 
1987–2000   0.1 
Sources: See the text and note to Table 1. 
 
the labor force cross-classified by as many attributes as possible to 
capture its heterogeneity. Although census and survey data from 1850 
to 1954 do not make it possible to match a worker’s individual income 
with his or her age or education, we have been able to classify the 
population by gender, two different age attributes (adult, child), branch 
of activity, income, and hours worked.
34 The first step in the construction 
of labor input series was to put together yearly employment figures for  
the four main sectors of the economy (agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
industry construction, and services) on the basis of population censuses.
35 
Employment in these four large sectors was then distributed into their 
branches. Up to 1955 population censuses allowed us to cross classify 
working population into 19 industries up to 1900, 21 industries for 
 
 
where L is labor input in year t, H is the measured work hours, and Ȝi is a constant which transforms 
the quantity of labor into its services.  
34 As a sensitivity test, in Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Proximate Causes,” we provide 
alternative labor input estimates on the basis of educational attainment data. 
35 Major shortcomings in Spanish census data had forced us to make some tough choices. The 
economically active population (EAP) is only available at benchmark years. Yearly EAP figures 
were obtained through log-linear interpolation of observations from census years. Later, 
employment for each major sector of economic activity was derived by adjusting yearly EAP 
series to the economic cycle. Since female EAP figures for agriculture are inconsistent across 
censuses, women in agriculture were assumed to allocate their time in a way that made female 
labor a fixed fraction of male labor in the agricultural sector. Moreover, agricultural male EAP 
figures at census years were corrected by assuming that the share of male EAP in agriculture 
was proportional to the share of rural in total population. A detailed discussion is offered in 
Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Proximate Causes.”  
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1900–1910, 22 for 1911–1950, and 24 thereafter.
36 L ack  o f  d ata f o r  
1850–1900 forced us to breakdown manufacturing employment into its 
branches by assuming that its distribution in 1900 was representative of 
the entire period.
37  
  The second step was to convert the data on the number of workers 
into days and then hours worked per year for the period 1850–1954.  
We assumed that each full-time worker was employed 270 days per 
annum in industry and services. Such a figure results from deducting 
Sundays and religious holidays plus an allowance for illness.
38 This 
assumption is consistent with contemporary testimonies and supported 
by the available evidence.
39 In agriculture, however, contemporary   
and historians’ estimates point to a lower figure for the working days 
per occupied.
40 Throughout most of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, peasants were only fully employed during the summer;   
they were idle for up to four months every year and worked outside 
agriculture. Therefore, we assumed that each male worker devoted 240 
of his 270 days to farming and the 30 remaining days to services. The 




36 Population censuses are available in Spain for 1860, 1877, 1887, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 
1940, and 1950. 
37  Unfortunately, we cannot carry out a sensitivity test for the consequences of such an 
arbitrary assumption. However, since agriculture and services provided most of the employment 
prior to 1900 (above 80 percent), the bias introduced by our assumption should not be very 
large. The fact that the number of hours worked across manufacturing industries did not change 
significantly during the late nineteenth century also works to reduce the size of the bias. 
Employment data on mining and construction is drawn from Chastagnaret, L’Espagne; and 
Prados de la Escosura, Progreso, respectively. 
38 Interestingly enough, a similar number of days is obtained for the 1960s and early 1970s. 
For example, for 1973, the Conference Board, on the basis of OECD data, estimated 2,005 
hours worked per person in Spain, while ILO reckoned that, on average, Spanish workers spent 
44.2 hours per week at their place of work. This means that, on average, Spaniards worked 272 
days per year. See Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Proximate Causes.” 
39 Soto Carmona, Trabajo industrial, p. 608, pointed out that, on average, the number of days 
worked per occupied up to 1919 ranged between 240 and 270. 
40 Day laborers, according to García Sanz, “Jornales agrícolas,” p. 63, worked an average of 
242 days per year in mid-nineteenth-century Spain. Gómez Mendoza, Ferrocarriles, p. 101, 
estimated that a farm laborer worked 210 days out of 300 working days per year in the late 
nineteenth century. Vandellós, “Richesse et Revenue,” reckoned that, in 1914, the average number 
of days worked per year in agriculture was 250. Simpson, “Technical Change,” estimated labor 
requirements in Andalusia’s agriculture between 1886 and 1930 and obtained even lower figures, 
ranging from 108 to 130 days. 
41  For the pre-1954 era, our main sources are Caballero, Memoria; Huberman, “Working 
Hours”; Domenech, “Working Hours”; Silvestre, Migraciones; and Soto Carmona, Trabajo. See 
the detailed explanation in Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Proximate Causes.” 





HOURS PER WORKER-YEAR, 1850–2000 
(semilog scale) 
 
Note: See the text and Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Proximate Causes.” 
 
  The amount of labor, measured by total hours worked, presents a 
moderate increase over the long run (Figure 4).
42 Labor force grew 
moderately up to World War I while it accelerated during the 1920s and 
early 1930s, partly as a result of population growth and rural-urban 
migration. Labor quantity rose again during the Golden Age (1951–
1974). The “transition to democracy” decade (1975–1986) witnessed a 
dramatic employment destruction driven by the oil shocks and the 
exposition of traditionally sheltered industrial sectors to international 
 
 
42 For the post-1954 period, labor force data comes from the MOISSES database (1954–
1963), Instituo Nacional de Estadística (INE), Población Activa (1964–1980), and from the 
official national accounts (1980–2000). Fundación BBV, Renta nacional, allowed us to 
distribute labor force across industries. Workers within each industry were, then, distributed into 
four occupational categories on the basis of Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) information. 
Finally, workers were transformed into hours worked by assuming that, in each sector, all 








































































































































LABOR INPUT AND QUANTITY, 1850–2000 (1850=100) 
(semilog scale) 
 
Notes: Labor quantity is the unweighted hours worked. Labor input, adds labor quantity and 
labor quality, which measures skills or human capital. 
 
competition. Labor market deregulation, a marked increase in female 
participation rate, and the arrival of immigrants—only in the last decade 
of the twentieth century—are beneath the rise in employment since 
1987. Population growth and the decline in hours per worker explain, in 
a proportion of two to one, most of the moderate increase in the labor 
quantity over the long run. Hours per worker and per year shrank from 
2,800 at mid-nineteenth century to 1,800 by the end of the twentieth 
century (Figure 3).
43 
  Throughout the hundred and fifty years of modern economic growth 
considered here, the rise of the quantity of labor measure in the total 
amount of hours worked was mainly determined by population growth. 
 
43 The decline in the number of daily hours worked per occupied led Denison (Sources) to 
introduce the caveat that the effort per hour was inversely related to the number of hours 
worked. Employment rather than hours worked then becomes the relevant indicator of the 
quantity of labor in growth accounting (Gordon, “U.S. Economic Growth,” p. 124). Here, 
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However, a closer look reveals how other factors at work conditioned 
its evolution across different long swings. For example, the declining 
hours per worker/year over 1914–1936, a result of the gradual adoption 
of the eight hours per day standard associated to increasing urbanization 
and structural change. In the 1920s falling hours per worker went hand-
in-hand with a significant increase in the employment rate, also linked 
to structural transformation.  Between the early 1930s and 1950s the 
rising share of the working-age population, a result of the demographic 
transition, made up for the contraction in participation and employment 
rates. In the Golden Age, the growth in total hours worked was slowed 
by a significant fall in annual hours worked per employed person and a 
rise in the dependency rate (the ratio of nonworking to working-age 
population). Later, during the “transition to democracy” (1975–1986), a 
dramatic contraction in the quantity of labor took place as a result of  
the surge in unemployment, a fall in the participation rate, and a decline 
in yearly hours per worker. Since Spain’s entry in the European Union 
(1986), the brisk recovery in the participation and employment rates 
help explain the increase in the total hours worked.  
  The third phase in the construction of the labor input is to weight  
each category of workers by its average nominal earnings.
44 The quality 
and availability of wage data necessary to construct these estimates vary 
enormously through time.
45  
  Figure 4 reports the evolution of labor input and labor quantity 
(unweighted hours worked) from 1850 to 2000. Although the evolution 
of labor input generally parallels that of labor quantity, the labor   
input does grow more rapidly because of shifts in labor composition 
(“quality”), which capture improvements in workers’ skills and, hence, 
human capital.
46 Three phases stand out in the evolution of the labor 
input: the 1920s, the Golden Age, and 1986–2000 (Table  3). Labor 
quality improvements contributed significantly to labor input growth in 
the interwar and the Golden Age and compensated for a decline in labor 
quantity during the “transition to democracy” (1975–1986). But it added 
little following Spain’s accession to the European Union in 1986.
47  
 
44 For self-employed workers, we have assumed that their labor cost was equal to those of the 
average worker in their industry (Cf. Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Wages”). 
45 Due to data availability, four periods have been considered, 1850–1908, 1908–1920, 1920–
1954, and 1954–2000. See Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Proximate Causes,” for a 
discussion of the sources and procedures used to computing wage earnings.  
46 Labor quality is derived as the ratio between the labor input and the labor quantity. 
47 This counterintuitive result for the post-1986 period raises the question of whether our 
labor input measure using the Jorgenson approach actually captures improvements in human 
capital affecting the labor force. Since human capital is usually approximated through education 
measures, we have constructed alternative estimates of the quality of labor using educational 
attainment. The results are similar. Our alternative human capital measure used data on age 




LABOR QUANTITY, QUALITY, AND INPUT GROWTH, 1850–2000 
(annual average logarithmic rates in percent) 








     [(I)+(II)] 
1850–2000 0.4  0.4  0.8 
Panel A     
1850–1950 0.5  0.2  0.7 
1951–1974 1.0  1.0  2.0 
1975–2000 –0.4  0.7  0.3 
Panel B      
1850–1883 0.6  0.1  0.7 
1884–1920 0.2  0.1  0.4 
1921–1929 1.8  0.8  2.6 
1930–1952 0.8  0.0  0.8 
1953–1958 0.4  1.2  1.6 
1959–1974 0.6  1.1  1.7 
1975–1986 –3.6  1.2  –2.4 
1987–2000 2.4  0.2  2.6 
Note: Labor Quantity is the unweighted hours worked; Labor Quality, improvements in labor’s 
skills (human capital); Labor Input, which adds up labor quantity and quality, is the flow of 
services emanating from labor. 
Sources: See the text and Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Proximate Sources,” and the note 




  In addition to the real factor inputs described above, we need to   
know the elasticity of output with respect to each input (și) in order to 
compute the sources of growth. Under the restrictive assumption of 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale, these elasticities can be 
proxied by the share of each factor’s returns in national income. Such an 
assumption might be objectionable as restrictions on competition and 
monopolistic practices are common in Spanish history.
48 If monopolists 
earned rents, our “naive” results (obtained under the assumption of   
 
structure (as a measure of experience) and years of education attained, calibrated with the 
parameters from a Mincer equation for Spain in the early 1990s. The results agree with our 
figures except for the 1920s, when educational attainment figures show no improvement. 
However, our labor quality estimates seem to be more consistent with the evidence on growth 
and structural change for the 1920s. There are also discrepancies for the period 1987–2000, 
when the labor quality shows a higher growth ( 0.9 percent) in the Mincer approach than in our 
approach (0.2 percent). See Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Proximate Causes,” for a more 
detailed discussion.  
48 Cf. Fraile, Industrialización and Retórica. 
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perfect competition) would bias total factor productivity growth.
49 Yet, 
even if this were the case, our results (as we shall see) would not be 
significantly altered. 
  Up to 1954 labor returns were directly estimated. From 1954 onwards 
we derived factor shares from the official national accounts that we 
previously spliced together.
50 To measure labor income correctly, it is 
crucial to establish what proportion of the income of proprietors, unpaid 
family workers, self-employed, and retired workers represent returns   
to labor.
51 We have assumed that entrepreneurs and self-employed 
workers have a labor income equal to the average compensation of 
employees in their corresponding industry.
52 Dividing total labor 
(including self-employed) compensation by GDP, we obtained the share 
of labor. The lack of information on land rents forced us to derive the land 
share as the residual after deducting labor outlays from agricultural gross 
value added. This method implies no returns to capital from agriculture 
and, hence, tends to overstate the share of land in GDP.
53 The share of 
capital was then obtained as a residual after deducting labor and land 
returns from GDP at factor costs.
54  
  Figure 5 shows the evolution of the shares of land, capital, and labor 
in GDP. On average, for the one-and-a-half centuries considered, our 
factor shares are 0.08  for land, 0.24 for capital—that is, 0.32 for 
property—and 0.68 for labor, that roughly match the 1/3 and 2/3 
weights conventionally employed in growth literature. Average shares 
vary, with labor fluctuating around two-thirds, except in the phase of 
accelerating growth, 1959–1974, and during the critical years of the 
“transition to democracy,” 1975–1986 (Table 4). Interestingly, the peak 
of labor share corresponds to years in which skilled workers represented 




49 Relaxing the assumption of constant returns to scale will also affect our TFP estimates, for 
our “residual” would overexaggerate TFP growth if the Spanish aggregate production function 
exhibits increasing returns to scale (Young, “Tyranny of Numbers,” p. 648). Suárez, “Economías 
de escala,” rejects increasing returns for Spain between 1965 and 1990.  
50 See Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Proximate Causes.”  
51 See Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Wages.” 
52 Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth. This is a common procedure in growth accounting 
(Jorgenson, “Productivity”). 
53 Because the agricultural sector shrank in importance during the second half of the twentieth 
century, the resulting upwards bias in our TFP growth estimates should not be large.  
54  Although we have estimated the sources of growth using three independent factors of 
production land, capital, and labor, in Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Proximate Causes,” we 
replicate the computation using only capital and labor. 
55 Prados de la Escosura, “Inequality, Poverty.” A rise in income inequality took place in the 
late 1990s, partly resulting from an improvement in the returns to property income (Alvaredo 
and Saez, “Income and Wealth”).  





FACTOR SHARES IN GDP, 1850–2000 
(percent) 
 
Note: See the text and Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Proximate Causes.” 
 
  The relative instability of the factors shares contrasts with the 
conventional assumption of stability. This is largely a consequence of 
data limitations, but the share fluctuations can be explained. Between 
mid-nineteenth century and World War I, the growing importance of 
capital can be attributed to rising investment rates and technological 
change favoring capital. The rise in inequality (from the late 1890s to 
the end of World War I) coincided with a return to strict protectionism, 
which favored land owners.
56 In the interwar years, the labor share   
grew significantly. Institutional labor market reforms favoring workers, 
especially the reduction in the number of working hours per day and the 
increasing voice of trade unions, contributed to a rise in wages relative 
to property incomes. Also the increase in the human capital endowment 
of the workforce influenced the expansion of labor. The early years   
of Franco’s regime witnessed a sharp decrease in the labor share, an  
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AVERAGE FACTOR SHARES, 1850–2000  
(percent)  
 (I)  (II)  (III) 
 Capital  Land  Labor 
1850–2000 24.0  7.5  68.4 
Panel A     
1850–1950 23.4  9.7  66.9 
1951–1974 22.2  5.7  72.1 
1975–2000 28.1  0.8  71.1 
Panel B     
1850–1883 17.7  9.9  72.4 
1884–1920 28.3  10.6  61.1 
1921–1929 27.5  10.9  61.6 
1930–1952 23.9  7.8  68.4 
1953–1958 28.4  9.2  62.3 
1959–1974 17.6  3.5  78.9 
1975–1986 23.1  1.1  75.8 
1987–2000 32.4  0.6  67.1 
Sources: See the text and note to Table 1. 
 
outcome of dictatorship’s economic policy that implied a redistribution 
of income towards property owners. Since the mid-1950s a rapid 
increase in labor share took place that peaked by the late 1960s, when 
pre-Civil War levels were recovered. The elevated labor shares reflected 
human capital accumulation and the more liberal economic policies that 
accompanied growth and structural change in the late Francoist regime. 
Since the early 1970s, however, the capital share in GDP has tended to 
grow at expenses of labor.  
 
MAIN TRENDS IN TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
 
  The sources of long-run growth in Spain are displayed in Table 5.
57 
Over the one-and-a-half century considered, TFP and  broad capital 
(physical and, to less extent, human capital) appear to be equally 
responsible for GDP growth. The early 1950s represent a divide 
between a hundred years of moderate growth dominated by factor 
accumulation, and half a century of fast growth led by total factor 
productivity, with 70 percent of the more rapid GDP growth after 1950 
coming from efficiency gains. 
 
57 In Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Proximate Causes,” we have carried out a growth 
accounting using fixed factor shares (their average over the hundred and fifty years considered 
here) as a sensitivity test. It turns out that the alternative use of fixed factor shares across long 
swings does not greatly change the results.  




SOURCES OF GDP GROWTH, 1850–2000 
(annual average logarithmic rates in percent) 















1850–2000    2.5 0.0  0.8  0.1 0.3  0.3  1.1 
Panel A               
1850–1950    1.4 0.0  0.6  0.0 0.3  0.1  0.3 
1951–1974    6.5 0.1  1.2  0.1 0.7  0.8  3.7 
1975–2000   3.0  0.0  1.2  0.0  –0.4  0.5  1.7 
Panel B               
1850–1883    1.8 0.0  0.6  0.1 0.5  0.0  0.6 
1884–1920    1.3 0.1  0.6  0.0 0.1  0.1  0.2 
1921–1929    3.8 0.1  1.0  0.1 1.1  0.5  1.1 
1930–1952    0.8 0.1  0.5  0.0 0.4  0.0  –0.1 
1953–1958   4.7  –0.2  1.3  0.1  0.2  0.8  2.4 
1959–1974    6.9 0.1  1.2  0.1 0.5  0.9  4.2 
1975–1986   2.5  0.0  1.0  0.0  –2.8  0.9  3.4 
1987–2000    3.5 0.0  1.5  0.1 1.6  0.2  0.2 
Sources: See Tables 1–4 and the text and note to Table 1. 
 
  A closer look at long swing intervals reveals that prior to 1950,   
total factor productivity played a far from negligible role in 1850–1883  
and the 1920s (Table 5).  As a source of growth, TFP may actually   
be underestimated as it does not include the additional capital 
accumulation that results from a productivity increase.
58  
  Total factor productivity led GDP growth during 1953–1986, a   
period that included both the Golden Age and the decade of sluggish 
growth during the transition from dictatorship to democracy. TFP 
contributed to more than half of GDP growth during the Golden Age, 
and two-thirds to its acceleration over the previous hundred years,   
a large role by historical standards. In fact, about two-thirds and   
four-fifths of the acceleration in GDP growth in 1953–1958 and 1959–
1974 over the previous long swings (1930–1952 and 1953–1958, 
respectively) were due to TFP, and in 1975–1986 efficiency gains 
prevented a GDP contraction. Since Spain has joined the European 
Union (1986), employment creation and the recovery of physical capital 
accumulation has offset the slowdown in total factor productivity.
  
  How do our results compare with those of empirical economists for 
the post-1964 era? A glance at Table 6 suggests that our growth rates  
 
 
58 See Hulten and Srinivasan, “Indian Manufacturing.” 
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TABLE   6 
TFP GROWTH, 1965–2000: ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES 
 (annual average logarithmic rates in percent) 
   1965–1974 1975–1986   1987–2000 
Myro   4.1  2.6     
Suárez   3.8  1.6   
Hofman (raw)      1.6   
Hofman (adjusted)      0.4   
Cebrián   4.2     
Mas and Quesada*        –0.6 
Timmer, Ypma, and van Ark*        0.4 
Our estimates     3.7  3.4  0.2 
* Excluding residential structures from capital input. 
Sources: Suárez, “Economías de escala”; Hofman, “Economic Development”: 256, 1973– 
1989; Myro, “Evolución de la productividad”: 1966–1974, 1975–1981; Cebrián, “Fuentes   
del crecimiento”: 1964–1973; Timmer and Van Ark, “Information and Communications 
Technology”; Mas and Quesada, Nuevas tecnologías: 283, 1985–2002; for our estimates, see 
Table 5 and the text. 
 
are in line with those available for 1965–1974 and for 1987–2000. And 
they too suggest that TFP growth slowed after Spain’s admission into 
the European Union.  
  Modern economic growth is associated with improvements in GDP 
per head but, so far, the discussion has been focused on absolute   
GDP trends. We need, therefore, to establish the connection between 
increases in per capita GDP and efficiency gains. Table 7 provides an 
intermediate stage, namely, the decomposition of output per head   
into hours per person and output per hour. Although hours worked per 
person declined in the long run trend, the 1920s and the post-1986   
years show a marked increase in the labor quantity per head. Labor 
productivity, in turn, grew at a modest pace before 1920 and since 1987, 
and stagnated in the 1930s and 1940s. But it experienced impressive 
gains between 1953 and 1986. Sluggish labor productivity lies beneath 
weak improvements in GDP per head, with the exception of the last 
quarter of the twentieth century when labor quantity and productivity 
evolve inversely. Hours worked dropped during the “transition to 
democracy,” but the decline was more than offset by the productivity 
surge associated to industrial restructuring and shifts of resources   
away from agriculture and traditional industrial sectors. Since 1987 the 
productivity slowdown has been compensated by a strong increase in 
hours worked. As Riccardo Faini put it for the Euro zone, Spain seems 




59 Faini, “Europe,” p. 80. 




PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH AND ITS COMPONENTS, 1850–2000  
(annual average logarithmic rates in percent)  








1850–2000 1.9  –0.2  2.1 
Panel A      
1850–1950 0.8  –0.1  0.9 
1951–1974 5.5  0.0  5.5 
1975–2000 2.6  –0.8  3.4 
Panel B      
1850–1883 1.4  0.2  1.2 
1884–1920 0.7  –0.3  1.0 
1921–1929 2.8  0.8  2.0 
1930–1952 0.0  0.0  0.0 
1953–1958 3.9  –0.5  4.3 
1959–1974 5.8  –0.5  6.3 
1975–1986 1.8  –4.4  6.1 
1987–2000 3.3  2.2  1.1 
Sources: See the text, Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Proximate Sources,” and the note to 
Table 1.  
 
  Labor productivity trends are determined, in turn, by human and 
physical capital/labor ratios and efficiency gains. Table 8 provides the 
decomposition of labor productivity growth. The main result is that   
TFP accounts for half the increase in labor productivity over the one-
and-a-half centuries considered. Furthermore, the fluctuations in labor 




  The main arguments of the article can now be restated. First of all, 
factor accumulation, especially capital, and TFP growth seem to have 
been complementary for GDP and labor productivity growth over the 
long-run Spanish experience suggests a two-stage process in which 
improving efficiency appears as a complex learning process that takes 
place once growth has been initiated by allocating additional capital   
and labor to production.
60 Abstention, rather than ingenuity, dominated 
 
 
60  New investment opportunities that increase capital accumulation as a result of 
technological change and exogenous increases in investment that raise TFP growth as new 
capital vintages appear offer ways for their interaction (Crafts, “Productivity,” pp. 522–23). As 
Collins and Bosworth, “Economic Growth,” p. 164, point out, technical advances might be 




SOURCES OF LABOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH, 1850–2000 
(annual average logarithmic rates in percent) 












1850–2000    2.1  0.0  0.8  0.2  1.1 
Panel A              
1850–1950    0.9  0.0  0.5  0.1  0.3 
1951–1974    5.5  0.0  1.2  0.6  3.7 
1975–2000    3.4  0.0  1.4  0.4  1.7 
Panel B             
1850–1883    1.2       –0.1    0.6    0.0    0.6 
1884–1920    1.0  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.2 
1921–1929    2.0       –0.1    0.6    0.5    1.1 
1930–1952    0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0             –0.1 
1953–1958    4.3       –0.2    1.3    0.8    2.4 
1959–1974    6.3  0.0  1.2  0.9  4.2 
1975–1986    6.1  0.0  1.9  0.9  3.4 
1987–2000    1.1  0.0  0.8  0.1  0.2 
Sources: Column I is derived from Table 7. For other figures, see Table 5 and the text and note 
to Table 1. 
 
long-run growth in Spain up to 1950. Thereafter, TFP growth, a “free 
lunch” to use Joel Mokyr’s words, drove economic progress. Our results 
therefore run counter to P. Krugman’s intuition that growth on the basis 
of capital accumulation ultimately slows.
61  
  Second, we accept that our growth accounting yields only a range  
of best estimates and that our coverage of factor accumulation is far   
from perfect. However, it is important not to exaggerate the skepticism. 
Alternative measures of factor accumulation and factor shares lead to 
similar results for TFP growth.  
  Third, our results do not appear unusual in international perspective, 
where there is growing evidence suggesting that factor accumulation 
 
embodied in new capital, while increasing TFP might induce greater capital accumulation by 
raising the returns to capital. 
61 Mokyr, Lever of Riches, p. 3; and Krugman, “Myth,” pp. 77–78. Slower TFP growth since 
1986 may, of course, make Krugman’s prediction come true in the near future.  
62 Grossman and Helpman, Innovation and Growth, p. 26. 
63 Crafts, “Productivity,” p. 533. 
64 Kendrick, Productivity Trends; and Abramovitz and David, “Two Centuries,” p. 35. 
65 Lains, “Catching Up”; and Altug, Feliztekin, and Pamuk, “Sources.” 
66 Collins and Bosworth, “Economic Growth,” p. 159. Young, “Tyranny of Numbers,” pp. 
657–61 and “Razor’s Edge.” 
67 Crafts, “Productivity.” 
68 Abramovitz, “Catching Up”; and Collins and Bosworth, “Economic Growth.” 
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prevailed over efficiency gains in the early stages of development. Factor 
accumulation seems to play a role during the transitional phase to long- 
run growth.
62 Once modern economic growth is under way, TFP tends  
to perform a more significant part. Indeed, TFP provided at least one- 
quarter of British GDP growth between 1780 and 1860, a proportion   
that increases to three-eighths when embodied technological change   
is taken into account.
63 Slow TFP growth has also been confirmed for  
the nineteenth century in the United States.
64  Long-run assessments   
for countries in the European Periphery such as Portugal and Turkey   
show similar results.
65  During the last four decades of the twentieth 
century, developing countries exhibited growth rates dominated by factor 
accumulation.
66 In modern Spain, as in Britain during the Industrial 
Revolution, TFP accounted for most of labor productivity acceleration.
67 
Does the ability to absorb and to adapt productively foreign ideas   
and technology depend on a country’s development level?
68 Comparative 
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